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ABSTRACT 
Running parallel to the economic theory of development, from Adam Smith 
to the present, has been expression of concern, what may be called an ecological 
preoccupation, about the capacity of the planet to support the increasing human 
population and to withstand the operations humans were carrying out on it. For 
Malthus this focussed especially on limits to food supplies, for his successors on 
limits of other raw materials, most recently on the sensitive dynamics of the planet. 
At the start there was no problem of communication between the economic 
and the ecological side; the same scholars wrote on both and they could be 
consistent with themselves. But in the past two or three decades the two sides have 
diverged. It would be too much to say that a debate is going on, for a debate 
requires that each side answer the points raised by the other, and that does not 
seem to be happening. How can the conditions for debate be established, and the 
public understanding and democratic decision making advantages of a debate be 
secured. 
The simple answer is for each of economists and biologists to acknowledge the 
results of the other in the field of its expertise, and to build its theory around these. 
That may ultimately lead to an overall consensus formula for sustainable 
development. But with the amount of knowledge now at hand and for a 
considerable time in the future the best we can hope for is incremental steps 
towards sustainability that are at least in the right direction. Some ten such steps 
are suggested. 
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FROM MALTHUS TO SUSTAINABLE GROWTH1 
Nathan Keyfitz 
THE CHANGING MEANING OF LIMITS 
Limits to the numbers and prosperity of mankind depend on technology, and 
a limit that seems to crowd mankind into a small space in one epoch can suddenly 
widen with some innovation, while some other more imminent limit makes its 
appearance well inside the first. For Malthus the limit on population numbers was 
food, and he saw availability of food as in all times and ages drawing a line beyond 
which mankind could not numerically expand. At their own choice peoples could 
press against that line, or they could stay well inside it. Long before the food limit 
was reached Malthus foresaw misery, as though within the boundary that surrounds 
us is a ring of increasing trouble. Like other economists of his time, Malthus did 
not foresee the technical changes of the 19th and 20th centuries. 
As the 19th century advanced it came to be thought that minerals set a limit 
(for Jevons it was coal), from the viewpoint of economic progress a closer limit than 
food. But with the advance of technology and observation of the possibilities of 
substitution the minerals limit has moved far out, so far that it can be disregarded 
for all minerals except oil. Water is essential, and in particular fresh water is one 
resource that cannot (yet) be substituted, that is in some parts of the world already 
making life miserable. 
Just as it is desirable to run an engine at a cruising speed that is considerably 
less than its top speed, so there are many advantages in not pressing against the 
world population carrying capacity, whatever that may be. In terms of the limits 
concept, this translates into having mankind's numbers stay well within the 
boundaries set by the concentric circles of the various kinds of life sustaining 
resources. Of these reasons :;ie most important is our ignorance of just what we are 
doing to the terrestrial support systems on which we press; in our ignorance we may 
unwittingly be bringing some other limiting circle uncomfortably close to us. 
The Green Revolution is to be interpreted as a moving outward of the food 
limit to population. But localities must be differentiated, for some countries and 
parts of countries have little access to world supplies. We had better think of each 
area having its set of concentric circles, representing the various limits to which it 
is subject, and for some the food limit is very close. 
l ~ x ~ a n d e d  version of a chapter submitted for People of Euro~e:  History of European Specificity 
in a World-Wide Context, Vol. 3, The Environment and Sustainable Growth, to be published (in 
Italian) by the Istituto Poligraphico deUo Stato, Rome. 
If we recognize the power of technology, but admit that the devising and 
application of technology requires capital, then capital sets limits, especially to the 
population that can prosper. The current shortage of capital in the world brings all 
the limiting circles closer, i.e. reduces the possible population on the one side, and 
reduces welfare even if densities are much lower than are possible. 
To establish the boundaries set by various essentials for human life that are 
finite in quantity is a complex matter, as many of those that write about carrying 
capacity do not sufficiently recognize. The circles that bound us are constantly in 
motion, with the advances of technology and changes in natural conditions, many 
of them initiated by human action. The global warming of the next century will 
probably bring closer the food limit for the world as a whole, and will certainly 
bring it closer for many localities. In the face of complexities and uncertainties, and 
without any deeper knowledge than we now posses, it is fortunate that some actions 
can be clearly specified, some sequences of behavior initiated, that unambiguously 
push outward the circles limiting population and prosperity, irrespective of what the 
ultimate total solution of the overall environment problem may turn out to be. 
WHAT MALTHUS REALLY SAID 
Malthus is not a name beloved in social science. The strongest testimony to his 
unpopularity is the way he is misquoted, apparently by people who find him so 
objectionable that they will not read him, and instead of using his words they 
construct phrases for him that they can easily refute. Thus one reads that "Malthus 
says that the human population will outgrow its food supplies." Even stronger, in the 
writing of one of my colleagues: 
Malthus foresaw that population growth would eventually outrun the 
carrying capacity of the earth. 
As I read Malthus, he would have said that the statements so attributed to him are 
self-contradictions--population cannot outrun carrying capacity by definition. What 
he said in his 1798 was that population tends to press against carrying 
capacity (what he called the means of subsistence.) It was the pressure of 
population that would keep people poor and death rates high. His thesis to this 
effect was adopted by ~ a r w i n , ~  but Malthus himself branched off on a different 
path in the later editions of his Essay, that were wholly different books. I submit 
that the real Malthus was not the exuberant youth who wrote the first edition, but 
the scholar who expressed his more mature broodings and empirical observations 
in the subsequent series. The first Essay was a purely biological model; the later 
2~ convenient version of the first edition of t h e m :  Malthus, Thomas Robert. [I7981 1%7. 
Po~ulation: The First Essay. With a foreword by Kenneth E. Boulding. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press. 
3 ~ n  his Autobiography Darwin says that on reading Malthus "At last I had got an idea by which 
to work." 
books were genuinely inter-disciplinary, among the few clear examples of that much 
abused term. 
The way that Malthus made his later work interdisciplinary, in fact a genuine 
biological-social model, was by introducing the notion of preventive checks. He  lived 
in the time of the Enlightenment, and some of its spirit appears in his writing. For 
instance he strongly favored education of the masses, when many of his countrymen 
thought that education was a threat to social stability. Malthus saw educated people 
as more able to exercise childbearing restraint, and dozens of studies in our own 
day show this--especially with emphasis on the education of women. Above all, 
Malthus saw people as having choices. None of this reading of Malthus is original 
with me. To quote one source: 
Thomas Robert Malthus was one of the few theorists of population who 
was aware of the fact that the "natural desire for children" can be 
modified by human reason, i.e. that such a desire is not natural at alL4 
I will show various directions in which we have to supersede Malthus, but the 
dilemma that he posed is going to remain with us for a long time, even though its 
form will change. A title such as, "Laying the Ghost of Malthus," also due to a 
colleague of mine, may help to sell books, but a scholar wants to know why it is that 
despite all that has happened since, the ghost of Malthus still walks abroad. 
To appreciate the sheer logical elegance of Malthus' argument, without 
necessarily accepting his conclusion, we open the original edition of the Essay and 
read in its first few paragraphs: 
Population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio. Subsistence 
increases in an arithmetical ratio .... By that law of nature that makes food 
necessary to the life of man, the effects of these two powers must be kept 
equal. This implies a strong and constantly operating check on population 
from the difficulty of subsistence. 
Nothing here about mankind outrunning its food supplies, let alone the earth's 
carrying capacity. That would only be possible if the surplus individuals could exist 
without food. Malthus may be right or he may be wrong, but he is not a simple- 
minded fool. He  was always aware that his radical ideas would be criticized, and 
chose his words with the utmost care, and always in anticipation of what his 
opponents would come up with. One of the fascinating things about his writing is 
the way that he sets up defenses-outer walls, battlements, moats, traps of all kinds-- 
to make the fortress of his thought impregnable to any logical onslaught, and then 
subsequently to any refutation by data. 
4~einsohn, G .  and 0. Steiger. 1983. The rationale underlying Malthus's theory of population. 
Pages 223-232 in Malthus Past and Present, edited by Jacques DupPquier. London: Academic Press. 
Consider for example, the first sentence quoted above, about population 
increasing in a geometrical ratio. Malthus knew that people would say it does not 
in fact so increase, and would give his opponent numbers to show growth rates 
slowing down over time. He covered himself on that by putting in the words 'if 
unchecked,' so placing his assertion beyond any possibility of contradiction. 
I am not trying to persuade the reader that Malthus is right, but only to give 
him or her respect for his mode of thought and his literary style. Though logically 
unanswerable, the assertion of the first sentence quoted above is still substantively 
wrong, since in human populations growth is indeed checked, and that nearly 
everywhere. I repeat that Darwin, looking for a theory to apply to population in 
general, seized on this phrase of Malthus, and it remains a fundamental part of 
biology to the present day, while Malthus turned away from this initial phase of his 
work. He had no ambition to be a biologist, so as history shows he left it to Darwin 
writing 60 years later to be the inheritor of the first edition of the Essav. Malthus 
himself took a turn that would make his theory fit the human capacity for foresight 
and conscious adaptation. 
He did this by his notion of 'preventive checks.' We talk much of the 
importance of interdisciplinary models for dealing with real problems, rarely 
recalling that Malthus had one of the first and best more than a century before 
'interdisciplinary' became part of our European languages. He saw constant pressure 
of population against food and other resources, but mankind seeing what is coming 
limits its progeny.' 
Malthus thought, and the view held until well after World War 11, that food 
supplies depend on the extent of territory, and once all the good land was taken up 
an absolute limit to food supplies would have been reached. With the enormous 
increase in yields resulting from the Green Revolution that view has become 
untenable. That brings us, as implied above, to what is really wrong with Malthus: 
he failed to anticipate high-yielding varieties of rice and wheat, along with synthetic 
fertilizers. But he had good company among students of agriculture. As recently as 
the 1930s few experts foresaw the enormous increase that lay just ahead in the 
productivity of land, its yield. As for the returns to labor, writers refused to believe 
that productivity of agricultural workers could match those in secondary industry. 
If the phenomenal gains in farm yield, both per worker and per hectare, could not 
be anticipated even two decades before, we must exonerate Malthus for failing to 
anticipate them. 
' ~ n  one sense we are all Malthusians. The Catholic Church professes not to be, and yet its 
celibate priesthood was an effective instrument for holding down population in a time when priests 
were numerically siflcant, and when monogamy was the rule. Malthus approved of celibacy, but 
he did not approve of contraception. Unable to bring himself even to mention it directly, he criticizes 
the "method described by M. Condorcet" as taking the tension out of life, a French device for making 
pleasure too easy. It could well be used on the Continent by decadent Europeans, but was not for the 
morally rugged Englishman. In fact it was more than a century after the death of Malthus before 
contraception would be publicly mentionable in any country and laws against it taken off the books. 
Yet even though wrong on food, Malthus had a grip on a more general threat, 
one that is still hanging over us, and that will apply to the end of time irrespective 
of any miracles of technology. As the food limit is pressed further into the future 
by technology that in turn is pushed by the market, a succession of other limits 
come into sight. We are relieved of worry about starvation (with some exceptions 
to be mentioned later) but what about energy, and beyond that about global 
warming, or the ozone layer? If not now then very soon we had better start to think 
of the ecosphere in which all our activities are seated as small in relation to the 10 
billion people who will be seeking to live in it by the year 2050. As small even now 
in relation to the billion or so people who are 'developed', modern, mobile, using 
the instruments of high technology. 
We can argue whether the place of food in the Malthusian scheme is taken by 
fuels, fresh water, breathable air, or a planet whose essential dynamics are seriously 
interfered with at our peril, but it cannot be denied that with the pushing back of 
the Malthusian limit of food other limits have to be faced. 
CARRYING CAPACITY 
To a farmer nothing is plainer than that his pastures have a certain carrying 
capacity, a maximum amount of beef or milk they can produce. The farmer brings 
to bear his considerable knowledge of animal nutrition (probably better than our 
knowledge of human nutrition) and uses an engineering type of calculation to 
decide the number of his cows. 
~ e v e l l e ~  takes up the population-carrying capacity of the world as a whole, 
starting with the energy of sunlight, going through its transformation into primary 
(cereal) food energy, up to its availability for support of populations. His energy 
conversion process is modeled on that of an Iowa farmer, and he leaves open how 
the gap between the present 5 billion world population and the 30 billion physical 
potential can be covered. 
The notion of carrying capacity is congenial to natural scientists and an 
irritation to social scientists. To biologists or agriculturalists used to studying the 
capacity of pasture lands to maintain livestock, it seems natural to take it as 
Malthus did that beyond a certain population in a given area growth will bring 
misery. Those who sponsor this view tend to downplay trade, but even if trade is 
admitted there must be a certain carrying capacity for the world as a whole, say 
those who write along this line. Thus a background paper by Kirchner to the 1984 
World Develo~ment Report starts: 
The carrying capacity of a particular region is the maximum population 
of a given species that can be supported indefinitely, allowing for 
kevelle,  Roger. 1975. Will the earth's land and water resources be suf!icient for future 
populations? Pages 3-14 in The Population Debate: Dimensions and Persvectives, Volume 2. Papers 
of the World Population Conference, Bucharest, 1974, 2 Volumes. New York: United Nations. 
seasonal and random changes, without any degradation of the natural 
resource base that would diminish this maximum population in the future. 
The concept of carrying capacity is familiar to biologists and wildlife 
managers .... With modifications, it is also an important measure of the 
ability of regions to support human pop~lations.~ 
The economic viewpoint stands in contrast to this, and one branch of the 
debate concerns food resources and the effects of MDC extravagance in converting 
the largest part of its grain calories into meat. D. Gale Johnson8 makes the point 
that curbing this extravagance would be a mistaken policy: if the industrial countries 
had held down their indirect grain consumption there would have been less 
produced, reserve stocks would have been smaller, and the institutions required to 
handle grain exports would not have taken their present shape. In a sense American 
extravagance in meat consumption results, through the market, in a world reserve 
against famine. 
The argument is unassailable on its terms, but the terms change once the 
environment is brought in. The loss of soil and of water, the poisoning of streams, 
etc., are a different and more difficult matter. 
THE MODEL BUILDERS 
The classical economic tradition of population study, concerned with the limits 
to land and hence to food supplies, sensing the impossibility of indefinite 
exponential increase, has now passed to scholars of other disciplines. An early 
widely read exposition was due to the Meadows and sponsored by the Club of 
~ o m e . ~  It was followed by Mesavoric and pestello and other writers. A similar 
spirit animated a later investigation led by Barney." International organizations, 
especially the ILO, came into this, and many models were built for, or in any case 
applied to, particular countries; among these the BACHUE models are the most 
often cited. On the other side, Kahn and wiener12 attracted attention with a model 
in which population was no great obstacle to economic growth. 
7 ~ o r l d  Bank. 1984. World Development Report 1984. New York: Oxford University Press. 
8~ohnson, D. Gale. 1974. World Food Problems and Pros~ects. Washington, D.C.: American 
Enterprise Institute. 
'~eadows ,  D.H., D.L. Meadows, J. Randers, and W.W. Behrens 111.1972. The Limits to Growth. 
New York: Universe Books. 
'O~esavoric, M., and E. Pestel. 1974. Mankind at the Turning Point. New York: E.P. Dutton. 
l l~arney,  G.O. 1980. Global uX)O: The Report to the President. Entering the 21st Century. 
Washington, D.C.: USGPO. 
12~ahn,  Herman, and Anthony J. Wiener. 1%7. The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation 
on the Next Thirty-Three Years. New York: Macmillan. 
The acknowledged antecedent of the Club of Rome model-building was Jay 
W.  orr rester.'^ Population is central for Forrester. He has feedback loops in which 
population is respectively controlled by crowding, pollution, food supply, natural 
resources. Any one of these can bring the exponential population growth to a halt, 
indeed cause sudden and tragic collapse of population (Chapters 2 and 4). "The 
Malthusian thesis has been true and is at work at all times" (p. 27). 
Forrester explains the suddenness of reaching "crisis level" by the property of 
an exponential, for instance one that doubles every 50 years (p. 3). "Even though 
nothing has changed in the underlying law which until then has governed 
growth ... within one lifetime, dormant forces within the world system can exert 
themselves and take control" (p. 5); "food ... has been potentially sufficient throughout 
all of history," yet suddenly we have a "starvation crisis" (p. 7). Though conditions 
do not now appear exceptionally bright, yet in comparison with both past and future 
"we may now be living in a 'golden age"' (p. 11): 
There may be no realistic hope of the present underdeveloped countries 
reaching the standard of living demonstrated by the present industrialized 
natio ns.... With four times as many people ... their rising ... could mean an 
increase of 10 times in the natural resource and pollution load on the 
world environment. (p. 12) 
DO POPULATION CONTROL AND CONSERVATION OF THE 
ENVIRONMENT MATTER? 
Answers given by eminent scholars to the question whether population matters 
vary all the way from something like 
Yes, but only to the extent that environment damage may lower the 
growth of the economy by 1 percentage point at most, and since we are 
not sure even of that the whole subject can safely be wbordinated to the 
installation of proper economic policies14 
Yes, to the point where climate and other parts of the terrestrial 
dynamics drastically alter their functioning, and much of the planet is 
turned into desert." 
'%orrester, Jay W. 1971. World Dvnamics. Cambridge: Wright-Allen Press. 
' 4 ~  slightly caricatured rendition of the spirit of National Research Council, Working Group on 
Population Growth and Economic Development, Committee on Population. 1986. Povulation Growth 
and Economic Development: Poliw Ouestions. Washington, D.C. National Academy Press. 
 o he view expressed by eminent biologists Ehrlich, Paul R. and Anne H. Ehrlich. 1990. The 
-. New York: Simon and Schuster, is representative of the thinking of biologists 
in general. 
On what should be done about it the answers vary correspondingly, from 
Nothing, or at most very little16 
Alter the way of life world wide to styles that are innocuous to the 
planetary processes,'7 and in addition lower the birth rate to the point 
where the world population is stabilized at about its present level or even 
reduced by rigorous birth contr01.'~ 
I shall not here make reference to all of the multitude of scholarly writings 
that carry these extreme messages, or messages intermediate between them, having 
done so in an earlier paper.'9 Here it is enough to say that the only writers 
considered in establishing the spectrum of current thought are scholars of 
established reputation, and the differences among them are sharp. 
Given their eminence one can only be surprised at the absence of civility in 
the style of discussion. Neither side sees the arguments of the other as rational. 
William Baumol of Princeton speaks of "many hysterical predictions about our 
environmental future" (back cover of Simon2') and Harold Barnett of "popular 
press books with their whole array of crisis allegations" (same back cover). Says 
Simon: 
The Limits to Growth2' simulation ... is not worth detailed discussion or 
criticism ...[ it is] public relations hype ...[ and the Club of Rome] scared 
many people with these lies." 
1 6 ~ a n y  economists, including Srinivasan, T.N. 1987. Population and food. Page 24 in Population 
Growth and Economic Develo~ment: Issues and Evidence, edited by D. Gale Johnson and Ronald D. 
Lee. Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press. 
"MY summary statement of Commoner, Barry H. 1971. The Closing Circle: Nature. Man. and 
Technology. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
18~hrlich and ~hrlich, op. cit. 
19~eyfitz, N. 1991. Population and development within the ecosphere: One view of the literature. 
Povulation Index 57(1):5-22 (Spring). 
20~imon, Julian L. 1981. The Ultimate Resource. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
21~eadows, et al., op. cit. 
22~irnon, OD. cit., p. 286. 
And the same applies to other work, entirely unrelated to the Club of Rome: 
Global 2000 's~~ conclusions are "almost wholly without merit and the method 
shoddy." The style of debate, a debate between adherents of different disciplines for 
the most part, like different religions that pour anathemas on one another, is that 
neither can fit the other into its own schemes, or discuss it in its own language. The 
language of economics has evolved in such a way as to provide no place for ecology, 
and that of ecology can find no way within its vocabulary to express such economic 
concepts as substitution, price, or effective demand. 
But perhaps the matter can be resolved in international conferences, in which 
scholars and officials sit down together, often specifically to arbitrate such 
differences? Unfortunately it seems to be a matter of sheer chance which group 
takes hold in any given meeting, and for the collectivity of such meetings the 
differences are simply carried over. Thus the Brundtland ~ e ~ o r t "  put the 
population and the environment questions at the top of the world's priorities, while 
on the other hand the United Nations' recent special sessionz makes virtually no 
reference to either population or environment. Given approximately equal numbers 
of official reports that say "control population as a first priority," and "other things 
are much more important," they offer little net help to deciding a major question 
of our time. 
We cannot adjudicate the question by noting the eminence or the seriousness 
of the writers on the two sides. Nor can we count the votes of members of national 
academies,26 or the writings in reputable scientific journals. On the whole those 
who urge us to modify our practices both of consumption and reproduction on the 
grounds that the environment cannot stand what we are now doing to it are 
biologists, while those who tell us that we can safely continue with impunity, at the 
worst suffering some loss of income, are economists. 
I repeat that those taking opposite sides are respected scholars,27 and the 
considerations they raise are often highly technical and by no means easy for the 
layman to follow. Yet the conclusions call for drastic action, action that can only be 
responsibly performed by national administrations when they have the support of 
23~arney, op. cit. 
"Brundtland, G.H. (Chairman). 1987. World commission on environment and development.& 
Common Future. Oxford, U.K: Oxford University Press. 
z ~ e p o r t  of the Special Session of the United Nations on Revitalizing Economic Growth in the 
Developing Countries. 1990. Po~ulation and Develo~ment Review 16(2):379-84 (June). 
2 6 ~ Y  guess is that a vote in the several national academies of the industrial countries would 
overwhelmingly favor more expenditure on birth control programs, and more serious efforts to change 
consumption patterns in the interest of conserving the environment. But resolving the question by 
vote, however eminent the jury of scholars, is not the usual method of science. 
2 7 ~ v e n  though they are far from respectful to one another in their writings. 
large constituencies, even of majorities of their electorates. Here is a nightmare for 
democratic politics: what action to take on vital questions where the experts 
disagree violently. 
Many, including no less than the President of the United States, say that in this 
situation nothing should be done until more evidence comes up on which the issues 
can be resolved. We have to wait until we are surer of the facts. But that can be 
dangerous, especially insofar as the damages under discussion are irreversible. Is 
mankind to stand there like a hiker in the path of a raging bull, hypnotized so that 
he cannot move out of the way? This paper will argue that the disagreement of the 
experts need not transfix the citizen; that the citizen can in fact resolve the question 
even though the experts cannot. Once one understands that the experts differ 
because of a defect in the organization of scientific knowledge then one can take 
the question into one's own hands and provide the necessary information, indeed 
pressure, to the politicians. 
The experts can be bypassed by taking it for granted that they are each right 
within the framework of their own discipline, and we seek to go beyond their 
disciplines to find out what is right in a broader framework. To do this we must 
examine their arguments, accept what each side says that corresponds to the 
specialized knowledge of its own discipline, but accept nothing beyond that. 
THE MORE POPULATION THE BETTER ON ONE ECONOMIC MODEL 
Let me give a simplified example of the approach. Think of an economic 
model in which population is growing, say at rate 10Or percent per year, and that 
the growth of productivity, due to greater skill and better tools, is 100y percent per 
year. Suppose also that land is effectively infinite, and physical capital is made by 
the labor f o r ~ e , ~  so no separate provision for land or capital is required in the 
model. Then income per head will grow at 100y percent per year, and total income 
by 100(x+y) percent per year. 
There can be no question of the advantage of a large and growing population 
on this model. Not the smallest advantage is that errors of investment through 
misjudging which sector is going to grow will be quickly rectified; excessive 
investment in any sector will be underutilized for only a short time before the 
population and its buying power catch up. One could go on to list other advantages 
of growth, for instance the ever increasing demand would ensure full employment 
for each new generation as it came along. On this model there can never be too 
B~erfectly reasonable arguments in this direction have appeared in the work of Kuznets: Kuznets, 
Simon. 1%7. Population and economic growth. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 
111(3):170-193, and also: Kuznets, Simon. 1975. Population trends and modern economic growth-- 
Notes towards a historical perspective. Pages 425-433 in The Povulation Debate: Dimensions and 
Pers~ectives. Papers of the World Population Conference, Bucharest, 1974, 2 Volumes. New York: 
United Nations. 
many people. For development defined in this sense population growth is not 
merely neutral; it is strongly favorable.29 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
But the above model is much simpler than those of economics. Writers 
typically concede the difficulty in tracking causes and consequences. To Alvin 
HanseqW Simon ~ u z n e t s ~ '  and others we owe the proposition that the great 
prosperity and high employment of the 1920s and earlier was due in important part 
to the relatively rapid growth of population in the Western World, while the 
depression, and hence the unemployment, of the 1930s was as much as anything due 
to the low birth rates of that epoch, i.e. the slowing of population growth. 
Yet other writers take for granted quite the opposite proposition: that it is 
rapid population growth that causes unemployment. Thus Pravin Visaria, writing in 
the Po~ulation Bulletin of the United Nations, says that 
One of the most serious consequences of the acceleration in population 
growth is the difficulty of generating adequate employment opportunities 
for the growing labor force. (page 7)32 
On the testimony of some Third World leaders it was the pressure for creation of 
jobs, especially for city educated youth, that led to the great amount of borrowing 
in the 1970s, and hence the debt crisis of today. They see each birth today as a 
youth with high school or college training twenty years hence, and for whom the 
means to provide a job are not in sight. The potential political unrest that the 
situation is causing and likely to cause in the future preoccupies the governing elites 
in cities from North Africa to Southeast Asia. 
The press is full of such attributions of unemployment to too many preceding 
births and much is said on the resulting social unrest, for instance in the Maghreb: 
29~ster  Boserup has adduced cases in which population growth has been a stimulant to economic 
development: Boserup, Ester. 1981. Po~ulation and Technoloeical Change. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. What seems to have happened in these cases is that population pressure induced 
modification of institutions in the direction of private property, an effect that is clearly not universal. 
Unfortunately Boserup has had followers who generalized the result with no authorization from 
Boserup's data or their own. 
W~ansen ,  Alvin. 1938. "Economic Profess and Declining Population." Presidential Address to the 
Economic Association of America. 
31~uznets, Simon. 1979. Growth. Po~ulation. and Income Distribution: Selected Essay. New 
York: W.W. Norton and Company. 
32~isaria, Pravin. 1989. Population theory and sustainable development. Population Bulletin of the 
United Nations 27:l-29. 
... ils essaient de convaincre leurs voisins europCens, et singuli2rement la 
France, de la nCcessitC de mettre sur pied, pour le bCnCfice de tous, une 
ambitieuse politique de dCveloppement Cconomique .... 
Moins de chbmeurs, c'est aussi moins de mCcontents, et, partant, 
moins d'islamistes puisque c'est aujourd'hui, de l'autre cbtC de la 
MCditerranCe, la manikre dont tous les laissCs-pour-compte expriment, 
faute de mieux, leur ras-le-bol. 
Que les intkgristes soient finalement rCduits au silence par des 
mesures rkpresives, c o m e  on le voit en AlgCrie et en Tunisie, ne 
rCsoudra rien au fond. Des millions de dCsoeuvrCs continueront de 
tourner dans leur pays c o m e  lions en cage, enragCs de voir se fermer 
peu B peu devant eux les frontikres d'une Europe famili&re, et prCts a 
jouer les mercenaires pour n'importe quelle cause.33 
Nor is it only a matter of different writers opposing their favored theories. The 
same writer can stand on both sides of this particular fence. Thus John R. Hicks3 
says that "Overpopulation through shortage of land is one of the great causes of 
poverty there is in the world", but on the other hand and a few pages later in the 
same book, "It is not impossible that the slowing-up of population increase may 
have been one of the things responsible for the exceptional unemployment which 
occurred during the 1930s." 
Intelligent writers can argue such apparent contradictions because they take 
their basic starting points in different entities. Those who see the positive side of 
population growth, especially for employment, are thinking of the fact that more 
people means more demand for goods, and that demand will draw people into the 
making of the goods that will satisfy it. The effect here is very immediate, a matter 
of months, or at most a very few years. 
On the other hand if one starts at the labor supply end, treating demand as 
relatively stable, then the growth of population adds all those people to the labor 
force, and since they start with little money, their needs do not create opportunities. 
All sorts of things are needed by the increased population, but the effective 
demand, i.e. money in the hands of those who have the need, is lacking. 
For the Third World administrator the place to start is with capital: build the 
factories, hire the workers and start producing the goods, and the people employed 
in the factories will have both the needs and the wages and will buy the goods that 
they are collectively producing. But unfortunately the amount of capital that can be 
raised by any method within their reach simply does not cope with the huge amount 
of unemployed youth that is coming into sight. 
3 3 ~ e  Monde, July 12, 1991, p. 1. 
%~icks ,  John R. 1971. The Social Framework. 4th Edition. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 
pp. 56 and 59. 
A part of the reason is the huge disproportion between the kind of physical 
capital to be bought in the world today, with its limited job-making capacity, and 
the number of individuals seeking jobs. Scores of millions of dollars of investment 
in the copper mines of West New Guinea require a few hundreds of well-paid 
workers. 
START WlTH THE FINITE ENVIRONMENT 
Now let us move over a model at the other extreme, that would start with the 
finite environment. The environment has been compared to a bank account with a 
fixed total credit, from which withdrawals can be made, but nothing can be added. 
What are called the nonrenewable resources--copper, aluminum, etc.--would seem 
to be fitted by the fixed bank account analogy. Yet strangely enough, this is just the 
part of the environment that seems to be giving the least trouble; except for oil, all 
the natural mineral resources are holding out well, and have every prospect of 
lasting in adequate quantities until in the course of time replacements for them 
come to be invented. If this were the whole story then the environment would 
sustain for a long time indeed the exponential growth of both population and 
affluence with a rate of disturbance of the environment equal to 100(x+y) percent. 
Growth on the economic model would not be hindered by the need to reconcile it 
with the environmental model. 
Unfortunately there are two other chapters bearing on limits, the so-called 
renewable resources and various phenomena of planetary dynamics. 
RENEWABLE RESOURCES 
We think of renewable resources as including whatever grows--forests, annual 
crops, fisheries. These are renewable indeed, but only provided the amount 
harvested is below a certain critical level. Trees, crops, fish, all wither and die in 
any case, and up to the point of their natural mortality they can be harvested with 
impunity. We can think of a critical point in regard to harvesting level, and below 
that point the resource renews itself. Beyond that, even when it is only slightly 
exceeded, a cumulative process of decline of the resource occurs. It is cumulative 
because each year's take dim'lishes what is available for later years, and increasing 
demand in subsequent years comes up against declining supplies, so the destruction 
of the resource is cumulative. 
The same thing happens as to an improvident person whose expenditure is just 
slightly higher than his income. Each year he borrows the difference, but since he 
has to repay the previous borrowings with interest, if he does not change his style 
the amount of borrowing will rise steadily. The critical point that he has passed is 
the amount that can be spent without obligating the future income. Such an 
argument applies to individuals, to nations, to forests, etc. It applies to soils--taking 
out more of the nutrients than are being replaced will cause a cumulative running 
down, just as in the fishery and the forest. 
The increase of population and of its demands on the environment result in 
a different way in the destruction of natural species of plants and animals. Species 
being in symbiosis with one another the destruction of a forest eliminates more than 
the trees, but destroys the insects, plants and animals that lived along with the 
 tree^.^ 
PLANETARY DYNAMICS 
The ball of earth is represented simply by astronomers and does not look very 
complicated on geographer's maps, but geophysicists know how complex a machine 
it is, and how elaborately its many process fit together. The temperate zone 
summer, with hot growing weather punctuated by heavy rainfall every 5 to 10 days, 
is perfect for the crops on which the industrial countries depend; the pattern of 
winds that bring seasonal rains to the tropics is crucial to the billions of people in 
the LDCs. 
As population has increased it has necessarily balanced itself more and more 
delicately on the processes of each locality. With the denser and denser populations 
that balance is more and more easily upset. Variation of rainfall in China does the 
damage we read about because the population has pressed so hard against the 
ecological niches that the landscape affords. Failure of the monsoon, even partial 
failure, in India or Africa means starvation for millions. Without any further 
deterioration of the biosphere, merely because of the growth of population, we can 
expect more and more serious floods, earthquakes, eruptions of volcanoes--in the 
sense that the same physical events will affect more people and more property as 
the years go by. But on top of this the physical events are likely to be more violent 
as the environment deteriorates on all continents. 
That the physical condition does not stand still is due to its elements being 
interlinked. The cutting of forests affects winds and rainfall, and deserts can result, 
and the deserts in turn reduce the rainfall. This reciprocal action, not thoroughly 
understood, means that the most basic planetary processes, on which we all depend, 
evolve in a different way with the increasing density of population and economies. 
And now on top of local effects come some global ones. Superimposed on the 
southward movement of the Sahara, on the fluctuating desert of the American 
Southwest, comes a changing composition of the atmosphere, that causes Earth to 
retain a larger part of the sun's heat. That is something that cannot be locally 
controlled; because of terrestrial ventilation any local increase of the carbon dioxide 
in the atmosphere affects climate globally. 
Again we express astonishment that the complexity of the atmosphere 
processes, such that we do not know quite what the effect of warming will be, is 
used as an argument against doing much about it. One would have thought quite 
% i d s o n ,  E.O., Ed. 1988. Biodiversity. Washington, D.C.: National Academy of 
Sciences/Smithsonian Institution. 
the opposite: if we are in the grip of processes that we do not understand, whose 
consequences we cannot foretell, bringing about changes of whose only property we 
can be sure is that they will be irreversible by human effort once they occur, then 
the case for slowing such of our activities as are causing these changes is strong. 
How we should react to the complexity of terrestrial processes that are beyond 
our understanding is a matter that has had far too little attention. Acceptance of the 
view that because they are complicated and we do not know enough about them we 
should just go on doing the disruptive things we do, while we wait for scientists to 
come up with clear answers, would seem the height of irresponsibility. It implies 
also a degree of arrogance: when we do find out what the trouble is, we will be able 
readily to fix it. With more sense of responsibility and less arrogance we would say 
instead that the less we understand of what is going on the stronger the case for 
reducing our interference with natural processes. 
D O  WE KNOW ENOUGH T O  ACT? 
Some economists and politicians have insisted that no one yet knows enough 
about those limitations for economic policy to take the environmental constraints 
into account. Much of the discussion has been on points of fact: what will global 
warming do to agricultural productivity in various regions, is the ozone hole really 
going to spread, will we be able to get along without those species that are being 
lost, can we really not find places to dispose of toxic waste? 
Indeed uncertainties abound on these and other matters. Yet no one seems to 
have noticed that every economic question from whether or not to buy a dozen 
apples in the town market to national policy on money supply has to cope with 
uncertainties. It is not explained why uncertainties have become such an obstacle 
to serious thought and action just on this matter of special importance-- 
environment. And on what interests us here especially, the role of population in 
damaging it. 
And even more important, if we do not know what makes the earth-machine 
work, that is an  argument for NOT tampering with it. It is an argument for 
stopping economic growth until we find out the effects over the long term of what 
we are doing to it. 
HOW T O  G E T  T H E  DISCUSSION OFF  DEAD CENTER 
The device I propose for getting the debate off dead center is to ask each side 
to accept, just for the sake of the argument, the facts and conclusions presented by 
the other side. T o  ask, that is, I F  the biologists' worst horror stories are true, what 
WOULD BE the right economic policies? And if the economists' characterization 
of the merits of markets and the incompetence of governments were correct, what 
action would biologists recommend to avert catastrophe? 
Starting with the supposition that the biologists are right in what concerns the 
conclusions of their own discipline, and making the extreme assumption that the 
present course of economic growth and population increase would turn much of the 
planet into desert within the next century or two, what change in economic policies 
should be initiated now? Simply checking economic progress, stopping the clock, 
freezing haves and have-nots where they are now, will not do. What are the 
minimum and most likely-to-be-accepted changes in the direction of progress, what 
limits on the trajectory of the economy and of the population, would deflect 
spaceship Earth from the disaster (of warming, of desertification, etc.) towards 
which we will assume it is heading. 
Asking economists to forego debate on the findings of the alien discipline, and 
to accept them for the argument, has as its counterpart asking the biologists to 
accept the economists' view that the market is the best decider on all such issues, 
infinitely wiser and more farseeing than government. No one, least of all 
demographers, would want to go so far as to prescribe how many people can be 
sustained on the earth and its separate regions, that being intertwined with 
unforeseeable technical and social changes. But IF those deserts are truly spreading, 
warming accelerating, etc. THEN one would have to accept the conclusion that the 
number of increase from the present ought to be as small as can be secured with 
the widest distribution of family planning instruments and the most vigorous 
presentation of information on why they ought to be used. As long as there is one 
woman anywhere who wants to avoid further childbearing and does not have the 
necessary knowledge or instruments, there is need for family planning programs. 
This was exactly US policy until the last decade and it was beginning to work, 
when the US more or less officially reversed itself, and became preoccupied with 
supposed ethical issues in the control of population. In particular the use of 
abortion, pronounced legal by the Supreme Court of the United States, was 
declared to be unethical when used in the LDCs. Many in the social science 
community went along with the official change, and found reasons (reasons are 
always to be found) why the reversal was justified, why population increase did not 
make all that much difference to development, and why conditions of sustainability 
no longer had to be taken seriously. Man's inventiveness, human capital, would 
overcome all difficulties, and the more people the more geniuses who will provide 
the necessary inventions. (I am not exaggerating; exactly this argument has been 
seriously put forward by more than one social ~cientist .~~) 
The main conclusion of economics that biologists on their side would be asked 
to accept is the shortsightedness of governments. The myopia of business cannot 
and will not be corrected by official agencies that are even more myopic. If business 
is only concerned with the profits of the next few years, governments are only 
concerned with the next election. That is if they are democracies; if they are 
dictatorship they do have the power to protect the environment without asking 
approval of an electorate, but I know of no case of dictatorships taking advantage 
of the opportunity so presented to them. 
'%hese remarks are provoked by writings of Julian Simon and the pronouncements of the Reagan 
and Bush administrations. 
With luck the conditional acceptance on the part of each discipline of the 
conclusions of the other could become a habit. Economists and biologists would 
each find that they can live with the results of the other, a mutual acceptance not 
to be found today. Neither side could argue for the kind of facile solution that one 
now hears. Economists would accept the facts and estimates made by biologists, and 
they on their side would give up the hope that governments would act against the 
wishes of their constituents, however noble the purpose. Recognizing that the 
biological-economic-political problem is severe and permanent-that it is going to 
be with us for all of the remaining tenure of man on Earth--could become part of 
the basic assumptions of all disciplines. 
IF WE CANNOT DEPEND ON GOVERNMENTS, WHAT ACTION IS 
POSSIBLE? 
But if the disaster is truly facing us within the next century, and there are 
means to avoid it but we cannot push legislators out ahead of their least informed 
constituents--that way would only lead them and science to electoral failure--then 
what is to be done? The answer must be more knowledge--creating that is what 
scholars are expected to do anyhow--AND its diffusion to the public. 
Effectively getting knowledge into the minds of the public is frustrating for 
scholars. We have seen in Europe that a steady 10 percent or so of electors vote for 
green candidates, and the prospect of increase in this percentage is not imminent. 
In the hope of increase the greens widen their platform to include matters unrelated 
to environment, but this dilutes their appeal. Nothing is going to change this quickly, 
but that need not make us despair. 
The results of science do in fact get to be disseminated. The extraordinary 
change in health practices shown by current statistics of meat consumption, smoking 
habits, exercise, have all been occurring within a very few decades of the first 
announcement of the Framingham study results, the articles by Doll in Britain 
showing the relation of smoking and lung cancer, the US Surgeon-General's Report 
on smoking, and other analyses. Similarly it must in due course come about with 
environment questions: a result emerges from the laboratory or the field, it works 
its way through undergraduate courses, and from there it penetrates downwards via 
the Sunday Supplements to the literate population, and it penetrates upwards to the 
legislators. 
A SLOW PROCESS, BUT THERE IS NO FASTER 
In short the process of change can only be as fast as the creation of knowledge 
and its diffusion through conventional paths in societies with free flow of 
information. Our public sensitivity to environmental problems may not be instant 
and complete, but compare it with the total lack of sensitivity under totalitarian 
regimes! Or under all regimes before two or three decades back. And in any 
country the environment can only take its place within a scheme of priorities. It lost 
its place on the front page with the opening of hostilities in the Persian Gulf, nor 
has it entirely regained that place now that hostilities have died down. The process 
of scholarship and its diffusion goes at its own pace, and sooner or later gets its 
results accepted even among the most fickle of publics. 
No small part of the needed interdisciplinary study is the process of 
communication in which the relevant biology emerges into the public domain. The 
first stage after initial discovery often occurs in the classroom, the second stage in 
the media, the third by word of mouth for those who are neither students nor 
readers. We do not know enough about the laws of diffusion of scholarly results. 
It can well be that politicians are among the last to be reached, or at least the 
last to be convinced to the point where they see the need for taking action. A 
democracy involves many contradictions, among which the most prominent is that 
it requires independence and leadership on the part of its legislators, at the same 
time as it requires its legislators to do what their constituents want. No one has 
shown how these two contradictory requirements (both leadership and following the 
wishes of their voters) can be reconciled, and in our age of opinion polling 
followership on the part of democratic rulers has become more prominent than 
leadership. 
We have gone through the several stages from the laboratory to individual 
behavior of the masses in respect of personal health practices (obesity, smoking, 
exercise), and in respect of family planning in the developed countries, so let no one 
say that the sequence described is merely visionary. 
What will come when the unsustainability of present environmental practices 
(for example those generating carbon dioxide and those destroying the ozone layer) 
is widely enough realized are such changes as moving from an income tax to an 
expenditure tax, with differential rates according to the impact on the environment 
of various kinds of expenditure. From this point of view it does not matter how 
much money people earn, or how much they spend on personal services like 
physician's or psychoanalyst's fees, so taxes on these would be light. As things now 
stand we not only levy taxes indiscriminately from the point of view of the 
environment, but actually subsidize many anti-environmental practices. One example 
of such subsidy is allowing automobiles to be parked gratis on the streets of cities-- 
streets built with public moneys and whose use in this way encourages people to 
drive motor cars. 
But is not an expenditure tax regressive? Only if considered in isolation, and 
the effect is easily corrected. Any regressive effect can be offset by services to those 
of lower income, or even a universal demogrant or negative income tax. It really 
does not matter from the point of view of progressiveness whether one charges a 
graduated income tax, or has a uniform tax applied to all levels of income, and then 
provides offsets to those of lower income. 
And once such a more environmentally benign arrangement becomes general 
in the MDCs it will be seen and taken up by the LDCs just as surely as they have 
taken up our refrigeration, our air travel, and our motor cars. That will complete 
the worldwide change. But it will not happen this year or this decade. 
I emphasize that in the initial stages of its diffusion the discovery proceeds by 
instruction and precept. Some advanced countries will then take it up and show how 
it works, and others will follow their example. Such a path of change, going by 
example from rich countries to poorer countries, is exactly what took place in the 
field of birth control. It is hard to imagine any other route of transfer than a process 
of diffusion from the more to the less advanced countrie~ Imagine what the 
response would have been if we had continued in have 8 chi.'iren and urged the 
LDCS to stop at 2! 
Thus I am saying that we should assume that biologists and economists are 
both right, each in their own field. We should then find out what feasible path of 
discovery and diffusion of knowledge will deal with what seems to me the most 
pressing question of our time: the destruction of the physical habitat within which 
mankind and its civilization have to sit. 
One element in reaching sustainability, the time when the population-ecology 
interaction is likely to come into stability, is the control of population growth. We 
will see that some progress is being made towards stabilization, but not nearly 
enough. 
THE CURRENT POPULATION SCENE 
If what the world needs is population stationarity in both the LDCs and the 
MDCs, to be attained as soon as possible, then the trends are in the right direction, 
but recent data are not encouraging. On both sides of the North-South divide 
prospects were better in the 1970s than they are today. 
For the world as a whole the annual growth rate had fallen from over 2 
percent in the 1950s to 1.7 percent by 1975-80, and most forecasts made around 
1980 supposed that the decline would continue, though perhaps at a lower rate. Yet 
in fact the growth rate remains at 1.7 percent currently, and is expected to continue 
at that level at least to 1995 .~~  While the birth rate fell nearly 3 points per 
thousand over the five year period 1970-75, it has fallen only 1 point per thousand 
or less each five years since then. Meanwhile the absolute increase has been gently 
rising, and now stands at ove- 400,000 persons per five years (Table 1). In the last 
two years the United Natiol:> has raised its estimate for the year 2000 by more than 
100 million. 
For the LDCs the fall in the birth rate was 4 112 points per thousand per five 
year period in 1970-75, and since then has been closer to 1 112 points per thousand 
per five years. Some of this slowdown in the rate of decline is due to changing age 
distribution, but most is due to slower progress in the diffusion of birth control. 
Foreign aid for population control programs did not continue its acceleration of 
earlier decades, and that seems important insofar as such programs have a 
significant effect. The slowdown in decline of birth rates also coincides with a 
3 7 ~ n i t ed  Nations. 1990. World Population Monitoring 1989. New York: United Nations, p. 1. 
depressed condition of many of the LDC economies during the 1980s. It is probable 
that the faltering in economic growth is responsible for slowdown in the pace of 
decline of births. Whether continued migration to the cities was positive or negative 
for family planning is hard to say. Certainly crowding in the countryside, with the 
overflow forced out and into the cities, where prospects of remunerative 
employment are for the most part not expanding fast enough, was hardly conducive 
to increased welfare. 
TABLE 1. Population, births, and birth rates (CBR per 1000 population), World 
and Less Developed Countries (LDCs), 1950-2020. (Data from a tape distributed 
by the United Nations, 1988.) 
World Less Developed Countries 
Population CBR Births Population CBR Births 
With hesitation in the slowdown of birth rates there has come an increase in 
the number of countries that officially view their rate of growth as too high, says the 
United Nations.% "As of 1988, 68 countries (all of them in the developing regions) 
with 63 percent of the world's population, view their rate of growth as too high." For 
most of the LDCs the focus of nationalism on increased population has given way 
to focus on a better life for those present--though Malaysia believes that it can have 
both. 
Supporting this official dissatisfaction with high growth in some countries is the 
fact that some East Asian countries, among those that have shown the most 
spectacular economic advances, have exhibited sharp declines in population growth. 
While the direction of causation is not absolutely clear, yet the association makes 
officials ponder, and strengthens the political forces within countries that favor birth 
control. Officials also are much concerned about unemployment as a source of 
social instability, especially given the spread of education and the consequent rise 
of expectations. 
That slowdown in the decline in births in the LDCs has been to some extent 
offset by a further, and not anticipated, fall in births among the MDCs. Forecasts 
made about 1980 assumed that the very low birth rates then recorded were 
temporary, and there would be a gradual rise to stationarity. Instead there have 
been further declines, and even the ultimate rise to stationarity appears less certain. 
Some of the MDCs, in particular Canada, are planning to make up for fewer births 
by more immigration. Others are reconciling themselves to a shrinking population. 
Any notion that the high birth rates (for instance on the south side of the 
Mediterranean) can offset low rates elsewhere (say on the north side) had better 
be dismissed. As Alfred Sauvy has told us, it is not high pressure areas as such that 
make storms, but differentials, the existence of high and low pressure. And political 
storms are brewing throughout Europe, most conspicuously in France, as a result 
of differential demographic pressures and the resultant migration, legal and illegal. 
The United Nations points to a particular group, the least developed nations, 
with a population in 1990 of 425 million, whose rate of increase, 2.68 percent per 
year, is much above that of the LDCs as a whole, 2.10 percent per year. (1985-90 
figures). Not only that, but whereas the LDCs as a whole remained constant in their 
rate of increase from 1980-85 to 1985-90, the least developed countries rose from 
2.44 to 2.68 percent, and the prospect is that they will rise further, to 2.77 percent 
per year according to the UN projections, during the course of the 1990s. 
One other feature of the present condition has not been sufficiently 
emphasized. That is the suddenness of the expansion of population that has taken 
place since World War 11. That does not appear in aggregate numbers such as those 
of Table 1, but does come out in the age distributions, that reveal the increase of 
successive cohorts. 
The charts show this clearly by the vertical distances between the curves, 
representing increase in successive five year time periods. The left side of each 
chart shows the younger cohorts, while the right side shows the older ones; the 
division seems to be those born about the year 1950. The vertical distances to the 
left of the cohorts born about 1950 is anything up to three times that to the right. 
One does not even need statistics to observe the phenomenon, but can see it on the 
youthfulness of the people on the streets of the large cities of the Third 
3 9 ~  more refined calculation of the intercohort increase is presented in: Keyfitz, N. 1990. The 
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HISTORICAL EVOLUTION O F  THE RELATIONS O F  NORTH AND SOUTH: 
COLONIAL HISTORY AFFECTS LIMITS FOR THE LDCS 
We cannot understand the dissatisfaction of the Third World, and hence its 
instability, i.e. the political unsustainability of the present condition, without 
glancing back at its history. 
Most of the present LDCs have been through a colonial experience, in which 
they were directly ruled or indirectly influenced by a colonial power, for a longer 
or shorter time. Indonesia was subject to foreign rule over a part or a whole of its 
present territory for most of 3 centuries; Burma for less than one century. China 
was never quite part of a colonial empire, but it endured European and Japanese 
control of its affairs during a good part of the 19th century. Egypt was a British 
"possession" though less tightly ruled than was India. Thailand was always nominally 
free, though obsening the size of the British Embassy building in Bangkok makes 
one ponder what all those British officials might have been doing there. 
In the 19th century certain raw materials were needed in Europe, and 
extraction of these financed the colonial epoch. The metropolitan powers in their 
most expanded phase took advantage of steam transport, telegraphic communication 
and military fire-power to make distant lands politically safe for their purposes, 
sometimes coopting their traditional rulers, sometimes replacing them. We need not 
try here to evaluate the net benefit or harm of the opening up of the colonies on 
the one side, against the destruction of their artisan manufactures to provide outlets 
for the secondary products of the colonial rulers; we are still too close to the period 
to hope for agreement between the descendants of the colonizers and the colonized. 
The formerly self-contained tropical economies became raw material exporters, 
and this on the one hand increased incomes, but any benefit to the colonies of this 
increase was offset by the vagaries of markets to which the whole world became 
subject. Worse, after the colonial officials switched off their ceiling fans for the last 
time about 1950 and went back home they did not return to homeland economies 
that were standing still. Having lost their stake in the tropics they could put their 
laboratories wholeheartedly into the creation of alternatives to colonial products. 
They saw to it that the ex-colonies were able to take over very little of the financial 
advantages that their masters had been enjoying, as synthetics and other innovations 
undercut the prices of their exports. And when they took over banks and other 
financial institutions they discovered that there was little tangible behind the facade 
of the building--that the business had consisted largely in contacts that fell away 
with the advent of independence. 
Thus once the colonial masters departed much of the surplus they had been 
skimming simply disappeared. Faced with the adverse terms of trade prevailing after 
the War, the LDCs had to borrow for development in the 1960s and 1970s, building 
import-replacing industries with the proceeds. Plentiful capital in the world--at the 
time they borrowed--ensured moderate interest rates. 
By the later 1980s, after they were heavily committed to the loans and had no 
means of liquidating them, demand for capital increased in the world at the same 
time as saving diminished; interest rates rose everywhere, so that as the debts were 
rolled over the LDC obligations increased without their receiving any new funding. 
Meanwhile economic understanding around the world increased, at least to the 
point where most of the LDCs abandoned their ruinous efforts at import 
replacement. They invited foreign direct investment and reduced tariffs and 
administrative hindrances as they went for a much sounder export oriented 
economy. But the same world wide capital shortage that kept increasing their 
indebtedness reappeared in the limited capacity of the multi-national concerns to 
set up plants, and coincided with more intense competition among LDC countries 
for these plants. 
The last blow to the LDCs is a movement towards protection in the MDCs, 
pushed by their own unemployment. They are discovering that free trade may well 
raise the total national income, but that it at the same time shifts income from 
workers in factories to owners. Any workers who are obdurate can be brought to 
heel by a threat to move the manufacturing process offshore. And even if the 
workers are perfectly docile, they suddenly become too expensive. First World 
factories may (or may not) be more efficient than Third World factories in making 
the same products, but the ratio of productivity is rarely adequate to maintain the 
differential in wages. And many doubt the long run ability of the First World to 
make up for the departure of factories by stepping up the sale of services. 
Thus we have an example of historical irony, in that the liberal policies 
preached by the industrial countries, first to great resistance of the LDCs, are now 
more or less adopted by them, but circumstances have changed, and the LDCs find 
that the expected capital does not flow, nor do the expected MDC markets open up. 
The MDCs have themselves departed from the saving and the free trade that they 
were once inculcating. 
Those of us in the First World ought to keep the colonial and post-colonial 
history in mind, for it is certainly in the minds of the Third World when it 
complains of being a helple-s plaything of international markets. Without an 
appreciation of that point ul  view we cannot carry on a dialogue. 
Such history has to do with sustainability in a political and also in an 
ecological sense. The political instability stems from the rapid population growth 
and its extraordinary age distribution, with many young people highly educated in 
comparison with their elders. Quite different is the ecological instability. 
Desperate for want of foreign exchange, countries that lack oil but have forests-- 
Brazil, Malaysia, and others--cut and sell their trees at bargain prices. That is a 
process that will necessarily come to a stop within a decade or two when the forests 
are gone, and prudent restraint would bring it to a stop earlier. 
Not usually spoken of in connection with sustainability is the inequality 
generated in the Third World as it follows the path of development to which 
internal and external forces constrain it. Inequality is not the main focus of books 
on development, and yet if it continues and nourishes fundamentalist religious 
movements as occurred in Iran, and as is occurring at the time of this writing in 
~ l ~ e r i a ? ~  it could bring development sharply to a stop. 
INEQUALITY 
Those who see the social side as equally important with the technical and 
economic sides of development would want to take up such matters as the 
distribution of the gains of development among income groups, not the most 
popular subject in development economics. Jim M a c ~ e i l l ~ ~  and Pan ~ o t o p o u l i s ~  
among many others raise questions on distribution. The latter has a simple 
explanation of how it is that ~
in poverty, even starvation. 
If the average income goes up through gains at the top, while the bottom 
income groups remain unchanged, and there is a shift from cereals to meat in the 
diet of those benefitting from this progress, that will raise the market price of 
cereals (the famous food-feed competition) and rice or bread will become too 
expensive for the poor to afford with their unchanged incomes. Amartya sen's4' 
explanation of famine is consistent with this--he found that in Bengal in 1943 there 
was only a trifling decrease in the crop, but there was a serious increase of 
unemployment owing to the disruptions of war. He speaks of the loss of 
entitlements rather than the shortage of food as the cause of the famine. 
Why the gross inequality in sharing the gains of development? One part of the 
answer is given by Ricardo, who at least in this aspect was thoroughly 
~ a l t h u s i a n . ~  Growing population that pushes towards marginal lands (and 
marginal occupations) lowers the returns to labor everywhere, and raises the returns 
to land and by extension the returns to capital.47 The distributional effect does not 
happen in the same way for contemporary LDCs as it does for the purely 
42~arely  suppressed by a curfew and military force, followed in detail in Le Monde of June, 1991. 
43 'ac~ei l l ,  Jim. 1989. Strategies for sustainable economic development. Scientific American 
261(3) (September). 
44~ersonal correspondence, 1991. 
4 5 ~ e n ,  Amartya. 1981. Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and De~rivation. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
46My reading of Keynes's and other biographies of Malthus suggests that many of Ricardo's ideas 
were developed in the course of their numerous evenings together, even though it is the disagreements 
between them that are more often referred to by subsequent commentators. 
4 7 ~ h i s  last was Marx's contribution, who also in this was Malthusian, however vigorously he denied 
it, arguing that socialism would provide all necessary subsistence! 
agricultural societies that Ricardo had in mind, but the mechanism is found in all 
ages. It is discussed by economists (for instance Todaro) under the heading of 
dualism, that is accentuated by rapid population growth. 
Accentuated but not entirely created by population. Economists believe, and 
so do I, that sound economic policies would not only make for faster average 
growth, but sound policies would allocate more of the gains at the bottom. The 
point is especially stressed by Michael ~ o d a r o , ~ ~  but in one form or another every 
economist who goes into the matter finds the same thing. Governments set the price 
of grain low, which impoverishes the peasantry in favor of the city, but without 
relieving city poverty because of the influx of ever more inmigrants. Why, then, do 
Third World countries so persistently follow policies that every economist tells them 
are wrong both for growth and for distribution? 
The answer to that last question lies only partly within economics. When the 
same bad policies are persistently followed by countries on opposite sides of the 
world they cannot be simple mistakes. So underlying the economics is a further 
question: how is it that in the jostling to partake of the gains of incipient 
development those who are already better off can systematically invent and 
implement policies that enable them to appropriate so large a part of each 
successive increment of income? What is the relation of those wrong policies to the 
present difficulties of the Third World? And most particularly what is the 
connection between those wrong policies and the unrest that is so widespread, held 
down by the armed strength of the forces of order? 
Wrong policies are even more damaging than economists say, because not only 
do they slow growth, and distort distribution, but they are indirectly responsible for 
at least some of the damage to the environment. With a more even distribution of 
income there would be fewer automobiles and more bicycles in Cairo and Mexico 
City. That the price of gasoline is set well below what the country could earn by 
exporting the oil in effect adds to the income of the better off. What Alfred Sauvy 
says of water applies to many other subsidized commodities as well: 
the price charged for water ... is often less than its cost price; many people 
consider this "more social." In this way the bath of the most well-to-do 
person is paid for in fiscal terms by a household that does not even have 
running water.49 
Where electricity is similarly subsidized people can have air conditioning in climates 
that are perfectly congenial without it, and to run the airconditioners to so low a 
temperature that they have to wear sweaters. Subsidized electricity is a mistake of 
course, but why is the mistake not rectified the moment it is pointed out? And why 
48~odaro, Michael P. 1989. Economic Development in the Third World. Fourth Edition. New 
York and London: Longman. 
49~auvy, Alfred. 1973. -1. Calmann-Uvy, p. 173. 
are so many of the "mistakes" of such a character that they support a middle class 
style of life? 
That question leads in the direction of the study of culture. Economics is proud 
of being value-free--it does not tell people what they should want, but only how to 
obtain as nearly as possible whatever it is that they in fact do want. This wri tep 
showed to what a degree the arbitrary consumption choices of the middle classes 
around the world, subject to personal whim, the play of fashion, the promptings of 
the media, put an intolerable burden on the world's resources. The main point of 
that article remains applicable, even though now it is not so much nonrenewable 
resources (aside from oil) that concern us, but the disappearance of species, the loss 
of soils, global warming and other disturbances of the planetary dynamics. 
DILEMMAS AND CONTRADICTIONS OF CURRENT POLICIES 
The truly poor and disadvantaged present a dilemma to those formulating aid 
policy. They are the most in need of aid for humanitarian reasons, and yet they are 
not the countries or the citizens in them that will use aid most effectively for 
development. It is the countries among the LDCs that are effectively controlling 
their population and growing economically that are in a position to use injections 
of capital for the creation of infrastructure that will attract private investment, and 
this is the fastest track of economic growth. The problem is how to divide aid 
budgets between those countries that need help most, and those that will put it to 
the use that will most quickly take them out of the condition of aid recipients. The 
question is even more agonizing when we think that aid to the poorest countries 
helps further to increas; their population, while aid to the already better-off 
encourages population control. 
This problem of allocation between humanitarian aid and development aid is 
far from the only paradox in the development predicament of the present. To repair 
damage to the environment that they cause in the course of their development, the 
MDCs try to impose environmental constraints on the whole world, including the 
LDCs, that they could never have afforded when they were LDCs. The LDC elites 
ask the foreign investor to trust his capital with them, but on their side they have 
so little confidence in their own countries that they send a good part of their savings 
abroad. The Cold War was severely castigated as a wasteful arms race that diverted 
funds from development, but now that it is over, help to the LDCs in grants and 
loans has diminished rather than increased. LDCs complain of poverty imposed on 
them, but they find the money to buy arms and to engage in wars. The MDCs want 
international debts s e ~ c e d ,  but they set up trade barriers that block the imports 
of textiles and other goods that are the only possible means of payment on the scale 
required. 
At one time it was thought that foreign aid from America, Europe and Japan 
would quickly lead the rest of the world to self-sustaining growth. The paradoxes 
SO~eyfitz, N. 1976. World resources and the world middle class. Scientific American 235(1):28-35. 
above referred to help us to understand why the process is so much more difficult 
and time-consuming than had been thought, why after three United Nations 
Development Decades we have still such a long way to go. 
DOES ECONOMIC GROWTH ABSORB OR DOES IT ACCENTUATE THE 
NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF POPULATION GROWTH? 
I shall move back from social sustainability to environmental sustainability by 
citing a statement by a respected economist-demographer: 
Obviously, there is no population problem that a sustained economic 
growth of, say, 5 percent per year could not solve." 
Yet from the ecological point of view the 5 percent economic growth (as growth is 
now defined by increase of national income per capita) does not subtract from the 
population growth problem but rather adds to it. Only if the economic growth was 
measured in some way that allowed for the running down of the environment does 
the statement become true, but such a measurement of sustainable development 
could not have been meant because no one yet knows how to do it. 
ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS AND SUSTAINABILITY 
We note that ~ustainability,'~ that came into widespread currency following 
the Brundtland report, must furnish the basis of all proper accounting. The books 
of the sawmill must allow for the replacement of its building and machinery before 
profit is calculated. The running down of its machinery, either physically through use 
or notionally through obsolescence, is a real cost to the owners, and not to be 
disregarded if the calculated profit is to be a genuine one that the owners are 
justifying in withdrawing. 
Hence it comes as a shock to find that it is not customary to count into the 
cost structure the forest that is being cut down to provide logs for the sawmill. 
Typically the owners of the sawmill are not required to buy the forest, but only to 
buy a license to cut what they need in it. If society set the same value on the trees 
that it does on the plant and machinery it would indeed add to the cost of the 
lumber produced the cost of replacing those trees. Does our accounting treatment 
that assesses the forest at a small fraction of what its market value would be tell 
something about our attitude to nature? Perhaps it does, but perhaps also replacing 
virgin forest is too time consuming, but in that case it would be a matter of growing 
the equivalent value in trees. And going one step further, the flooding caused by 
logging in the Himalayas, the destruction of species in the Amazon, the loss of soil 
' ' ~ e m e n ~ ,  Paul. 1989. Limits to growth. Page 232 in Powlation and Resources in Western 
Intellectual Traditions, edited by Michael S. Teitelbaum and Jay M. Winter. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
in Borneo, ought all to be counted into the cost of the lumber if we are as 
concerned about sustainability in the face of changes in the biosphere as we are 
about sustainability in the face of running down of plant and machinery. Without 
such reckoning we are living off capital, and the market ensures that what we are 
doing will soon come to a stop. 
This same inadequacy of accounting systems applies to virtually every respect 
in which the biosphere is exploited. The running down of soils is not counted into 
the cost of grain, the depletion of the fisheries into the cost of the fish on our 
tables, the warming of the atmosphere with all the changes of climate entailed into 
the cost of travel by motor car. 
It would be disingenuous to express surprise that our accounting systems do 
not embrace these costs, for their estimation is beyond the reach of present 
scientific knowledge. We cannot estimate costs that lie far in the future without 
being able to make quantitative forecasts of the consequences of our actions for the 
distant future. If we later learn how to grow crops without soils then the washing 
away of soils is not a real cost today. 
I raise these matters to show that sustainability is not a readily measurable 
concept. We should not be reassured by the ease of measuring depreciation of plant 
and equipment. 
ECONOMIC GROWTH CAN BE SELF-NULLIFYING 
Insofar as the economic product consists of heavy cars and airconditioning and 
200-mile drives to the beach on summer weekends then more of it has taken place 
already than the ecosphere can stand over a long period. Any kind of growth that 
is in its very nature not extendable even in the distant future to the whole of 
mankind cannot ultimately be sustainable. 
This is aside from the fact that much of what we do is self-nullifying even for 
ourselves and in the immediate present. Last May (1991) the papers were full of 
the supertanker that burned and sank off the Riviera and threatened to make its 
beaches unusable for vacationers. Think of the frustration of those holidayem-they 
get to the beach at much cost and trouble, and then they find signs put up by the 
local health authorities forbidding them to enter the water. Yet they could not have 
the gasoline for their motor cars without occasional spillages on the ocean. The 
incident symbolizes the self-contradictory character of our pattern of expenditure: 
in order that people might drive to the beach, we transport masses of oil over the 
seven seas, with consequent spillages that leave those same people horrified when 
they arrive at the beach and find their trip there pointless. 
SOME INCREMENTAL CHANGES IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION ARE THE 
BEST WE CAN HOPE FOR IN THE PRESENT STATE OF KNOWLEDGE 
I repeat that we have no way of defining sustainable development operationally 
in the present state of knowledge, but we can certainly come closer to its attainment 
than is now being done. We do not know the answer to the preservation of the 
environment, but we know many pieces of the answer. They do not fall into any 
neat theoretical scheme, being a matter of pragmatic incrementalism, not to be 
scorned pending the discovery of something better. Following are ten of the more 
obvious pieces of the ultimate answer: 
k Pricing that allows for social and ecological costs. The forests as a 
resource are not a free good to be consumed as on the frontier, but a good of great 
value to the nation and to the world; the trees as a part of the cost of household 
furniture could be internalized through suitable taxes. The value of oil includes at 
least its alternative use for petrochemicals, and its price should reflect this value. 
B. Cost recovery. On some matters we know the costs exactly, yet we charge 
them to taxpayers rather than to users. If people are given something of value free 
or below cost they will use it wastefully. The streets cost the community their initial 
laying and maintenance; if they are paid for by the community then they will be 
used wastefully--there will be more driving and parking on them than if those who 
use them pay the full cost. The case for underpricing education surely does not 
apply to underpricing roads. 
C. Using less. Sound pricing plus public information will help push towards 
achievement of the same results with less materials, but we can go beyond pricing 
and impose standards. Motor car manufacturers can be required to turn out 
products that average more than so many kilometers per liter. The notion of 
engineering efficiency is important; even more important is the neglected notion of 
use efficiency. A two-ton automobile may have high engineering efficiency; its use 
efficiency is low if a one-ton model will allow the passengers to get where they are 
going as fast, as safely, and as comfortably. 
D. Provision of information. The desertification in the 1930s in the United 
States was checked by changed methods of agriculture--ploughing along contours 
rather than up and down the hills. For forestry, agriculture, layout of towns, 
efficiency of automobiles, research is needed to establish standards, which would be 
provided as free information, not necessarily written into law. In the oil shortage of 
1973 Americans were asked .o tolerate rooms as cool as 68" F in winter and as 
warm as 78" F in summer aid  most followed the recommendation. 
E. Qcling. Sustainability would be provided if all materials were cycled in 
the course of economic activities. That is impossible--the laws of thermodynamics 
do not allow us to retrieve the carbohydrate and oxygen after we burn wood or oil. 
But we can go much further than we now do. Compost can be made out of garbage, 
turning a nuisance into an economic value. Cycling glass, aluminum cans, 
automobiles, provide a benefit to the community but at market prices the recycler 
does not capture enough of the benefit to justify the cost of his operation. Rules 
requiring that the cost of recycling be paid at the time of original purchase of a 
bottled soft drink or an automobile would conserve materials and keep the streets 
tidy too. 
F. Small scale technolow. It is not by accident that most of the efficient 
technologies of production are large scale; large scale centralized production, 
appropriate to the cost of labor in developed countries, is subsidized in many 
indirect ways in the LDCs. We cannot expect new methods for village industry to 
emerge from the laboratories of Dupont or Mitsubishi. Yet in the glory days of 
Swiss watchmaking many of the components were produced in peasant cottages. 
Pottery, metal items, food processing, all now go on in villages, but usually with 
technologies less efficient than they need to be. Research can in some instances 
make village technologies that will pay proper wages and still be able to compete. 
The hope would be to retain some of the good minds of the village that now leave 
for the cities. 
G. Cultural development of the village. If we want to check the flight to the 
cities the villages have to have jobs plus something else. A start has been made with 
schools and roads, but schools give young people the desire to leave the village and 
the transportation system enables them to do so. One has to go further and include 
local banking, health facilities, mail, libraries, television, telephone, theater. Making 
the village attractive enough to retain its good minds, especially some of those with 
entrepreneurial bent, should be a primary objective. 
H. Doing things differently. Burning wood or cowdung for cooking was 
sustainable for an India of 100 million people; it is ecologically extravagant for an 
India of 860 million. I have seen a solar cooker made with aluminum foil on a 
papier-mache base at a cost of $10 for materials that in the dry season and in 
sunlight produces the same result. A bicycle gets one a short distance as well as an 
automobile does. Many countries subsidize gasoline where they should be 
subsidizing bicycles. 
I. Rehabilitation. Much of the damage to the environment can be reversed. 
Forests have been destroyed; they can be replanted. Rivers have been polluted with 
chemical waste; they can be cleaned up--as proven in the Thames and the Rhine. 
Coal can be substituted by natural gas, that puts fewer pollutants into the air. 
Automobiles can be fitted, or retrofitted, with equipment that makes them burn 
more cleanly. 
J. Population control. Given the present population size, density and rate 
of growth in the LDCs, family planning cannot but move the national and the world 
economy in the direction of sustainability. 
SUMMARY 
Malthus wrote much that we now know to be wrong, but on one important 
matter he was right: that there are limits to the growth of the human population. 
His failings were mostly in not anticipating the enormous technical progress that has 
occurred between his time and ours, especially in agriculture, and his puritanical 
insistence on the need for sexual restraint-no making childbearing restraint easy 
with contraceptives. Childbearing restraint without contraceptives is especially 
uncongenial to the age of instant satisfaction in which we live. 
Our age replaces the food limits envisaged by Malthus with other limits of the 
environment as we place on Earth the burden of more billions of people, and more 
trillions of dollars worth of economic activity. The food limit is readily understood 
and calculateds3 but the limit set by the requirement of sustainability is 
undoubtedly much smaller, as well as much more difficult to calculate. It requires 
technical knowledge that is not in anyone's possession, as well as social and 
economic knowledge of how people are going to want to live in the future. About 
1.1 billion people driving automobiles and eating meat to their pleasure, plus 4 
billion living restricted lives, is more than the planet can stand without some drastic 
changes in technology and in consumer tastes. The damage to the planet is already 
visible to far-seeing scientists, especially biologists, and one can expect it to become 
increasingly apparent to the public. 
The hope must be that the improved knowledge of what is going on will diffuse 
through the educated publics of the advanced countries, and will act on their 
consumption patterns, and that the new styles they set will diffuse through the layers 
of society, first in the industrial countries, then through the remainder of the world 
population. The diffusion of birth control shows exactly the pattern, and more 
recently the abandonment of smoking is following the same path of diffusion. We 
can see following these the decline of meat-eating, the use of lighter automobiles 
and of bicycles, and other changes that will make the level of income and its growth 
more nearly sustainable. We can hope that over a series of iterations there will 
ultimately come a level of population that the globe can tolerate indefinitely, and 
a pattern of consumption that the entire world will be able to share more or less 
equally. 
Not much more than this can be said about limits, given our ignorance of how 
quickly tastes will change, as well as ignorance of just what damage we are now 
inflicting on our fragile planet. The longer the change in our practices is delayed, 
the smaller the population that will ultimately be able to live on the planet, and the 
less comfortable life will be for them. Notwithstanding our inability to answer the 
big questions concerning sustainability, we can at least name some measures of 
change that are in the right direction. 
All this makes it a race between awareness and intelligence on the one side 
and desertification, destruction of species and atmospheric warming on the other. 
The race has begun, and in the present phase mankind is falling behind, but the 
ultimate winner is not yet known. 
S 3 ~ n  estimate of 45 billion adequately fed people is to be found in Revelle, OD. cit. 
